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Abstract:  
 
National legal systems increasingly appear to be burdened with the necessity of 
coping.  Situations of an “outdating” of the Law can arise when law-making tasks insist on 
being entirely joined with the nation-state viewpoint.  These everyday situations can 
introduce matters whose legal solutions may not be found within systemic boundaires, 
rather, beyond them.  To an extent, the Law, as it has been respectively defined through 
time, is loosing its effectiveness as a means of regulation in correlation with increasing 
globalization.  This paper seeks to confine the unforeseen consequence of the current 
economic and financial crises by arguing that the constitutional recognition of the rule of 
budgetary stability can precisely serve as a solution to exit the current crisis.  Whether or 
not this rule is adequate, necessary, feasible, and/or acceptable to a modern Democracy is 
subject to current legal and political, academic debate. 
 
Keywords: globalization, economic crisis, financial crisis, constitutional democracy, 
budget stability. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The main objective through the opening of new constituents under the European 
Union framework is to deal with adverse economic circumstances. Nowadays, it could be 
suggested that one of the most important topics in the spheres of economics, politics, and 
law is how countries can successfully emerge from the deepest recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and how economies, policies, and Law can survive the new crash1.  
The reforms of Articles 109 and 115 of the German Constitution2, followed by the 
reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution at the end of 20113 are paradigmatic. The 
main objective of both Constitutional reforms was to introduce a constitutional rule 
regarding budget stability.  In other words, the new rules now recognize the legislative duty 
to guarantee as much as possible the balance between incomes and the expenses.  
It is curious that the constitutional rules, being the most difficult to be amended due to 
the severity of the procedures, are becoming a main instrument in order to address or to 
give answer to the current economic and financial crises.  On one hand, economic and 
financial crises used to be considered a cyclical (but not an everlasting) problem.  In this 
sense, it is questionable that a Constitution is being the most appropriate tool to address 
these kinds of problems because a Constitution is a set of rules that result from a process of 
agreement with a vocation of durability.  Therefore, it may be better to choose a legislative 
rule than a constitutional one.  However, on the other hand, the tendency to balance the 
State budget is not a matter that yields general agreement.  Rather, budgetary stability is 
key of trending, conservative politics. 
In the case of Spanish constitutional reforms, many circumstances point to a desperate 
attempt by the Spanish government to assure its European Union partners of a real 
commitment towards solving its respective crisis.  It seems that this was the explainable 
reason for the urgency and lack of deliberation of the constitutional recognition of 
budgetary stability4.  In fact, the general obligation regarding the constitutional recognition 
of the budgetary stability rule in the Eurozone took place shortly after on December 9 th, 
2011 with the approval of the Statement of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area.  
This declaration was considered urgent to reform the Constitution (or equivalent standard) 
to introduce the concepts of budgetary stability and balanced budgets.  Finally, on January 
30th, 2012, the European Council finalized the intergovernmental draft of the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG).  All 
European Union member states signed the Treaty on March 2nd, 2012 with the exception of 
the United Kingdom and Czech Republic.  Given the circumstances, following Embid Irujo, 
it could be suggested that the “constitutionalisation of the economic crisis”5 is taking shape.  
 
1
 See Teubner, G., “A Constitutional Moment?  The Logics of 'Hit the Bottom' (April 19, 2010), in The 
Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional Differentiation , Poul Kjaer and 
Gunther Teubner, eds., Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011.  
2
 The reform of the German “Grundgesetz” was July 29th, 2009.  The reform tried to stop the indebtedness of 
the Federation and the Länder. According to Article 109.3 of the German Constitution, the Federation, from 2016, may not 
have income credits higher than the 0.35 % of GDP.  The Länder should have a budget in equilibrium from 2020.   
3
 The processing of the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution began at the end of August, 
channelled by the procedure of urgency and amendments.  It was published on September 27th, 2011 (BOE, No. 
233).  The Preamble expressly states that the reason for the constitutional reform was the economic and financial 
crises.  See the last issue of the Journal Teoría y realidad constitucional, Madrid, UNED, 2012, which deals with 
the topic of constitutional reform, and in particular, with the constitutionalization of the rule of budget stabilit  
4
 See Dávila, L., “La reforma constitucional”, 30.08.2011 (http://www.expansion.com/blogs/paseo-
aleatorio/2011/08/30/la-reforma-constitucional.html)   
5
 See Embid Irujo, A.,  La constitucionalización de la crisis económica, Madrid, Iustel, 2012.  
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Contextually, the paper's first purpose is to shed light upon the complex interactions 
between globalization and the Law of a Constitutional Democracy.  Secondly, the paper's 
objective is to explain how financial and economic crises (together as a global crisis) 
expose the weakness of the State and its Law in contrast with the strength of market rules.  
Thirdly, the paper attempts to underline how the solution to the debt crisis seems to be 
found in the general constitutionalization of the balanced budget.  Lastly, doubt is cast upon 
the nature of this answer to the financial crisis, aboveall from the perspective of human 
rights and moreover, from the mean of constitutionalism as a political and legal 
construction whose main mission is to restrain public and private power. 
Summing up the aforementioned, it could be said that the global economic and 
financial crises reveals at least two dramas: firstly, a growing tension between politics and 
economics that calls into question whether social power is still in the hands of the State or 
has passed to markets; and secondly, the erosion of the democratic system that is gradually 
moving away from the regulatory ideal of deliberation.  As such, there appears to be a 
growing distance between citizens and politicians, who, these very same politicians are 
more and more being referred to as a “political class”.  The work concludes by questioning 
the constitutionalisation of budgetary stability as being key to exiting the crisis by 
establishing in a “black and white” context and approach conservative principles as being 
principles of this “new” constitutional order that is arrising.  In this case, it may be doubtful 
if the genuine meaning of the constitutionalism of limit of power is in force.  
Perspectively, political and legal science needs to offer alternatives.  One of these 
could be the fight for a global public power (global constitutionalism, in the words of 
Ferrajoli).  Or perhaps, there are less ambitious routes than prior, such as preserving the 
main political role of the State, whenever the State has a cosmopolitan outlook.  In other 
words, maintaining the genuine sense of democracy and rule of law in a constitutional state 
that is linked to an increasing global society, becomes one of the main scopes of political 
and legal science6. 
 
II. Globalization: Importance with the Rule of Law in a Constitutional Democracy 
 
Political and legal changes in constitutional frameworks have been an ongoing topic of 
debate for jurists, both theoretical and practical.  In current, constitutional democracies, 
parliamentary law does not have the privileged or exceptional position that it does in the 
liberal or legal state due to the role of the constitution, which is to preserve citizen rights 
and the rules and structure of the democratic system.  Most modern legal systems have a 
written constitution with a rigid character (difficulties to revise), binding for the judiciary to 
be guaranteed (i.e., likely to be made effective by judges and courts).  The substantive 
nature of the constitution is the most relevant peculiarity of the constitutional state, for the 
constitution not only regulates bodies and procedures for law making, but it also establishes 
substantive content (rights, principles, values) that the legislator cannot overstep7.  
 
 
6
 See several critical argument of stablishing a Global Constitution in Laporta, F., El imperio de la ley. Una 
visión actual, Madrid, Trotta, 2007.  
7
 See an excellent reflection on “neoconstitutionalism” and its theoretical and practical implications in Prieto, 
L. “Neoconstitucionalismo y ponderación judicial”, Anuario de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad 
Autónoma de Madrid, 5 (2001).  On the other hand, see a very critical work with legal positivism from the 
perspective of the Constitutional paradigm, García Figueroa, A., Criaturas de la moralidad: una aproximación 
neoconstitucionalista al Derecho a través de los derechos, Madrid, Trotta, 2009.    
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Over the past few decades, legal theory has given attention to the implications for the 
praxis of the law into the constitutional paradigm.  In this paradigm, the constitution has 
more than just a rhetorical worth.  The binding nature of the constitution seems to change 
the balance or equality of powers between the legislator and the judiciary in the next sense.  
Parliamentary law ties the judge, but a judge cannot apply or use a legal norm, which can 
be considered as antithetical with a constitutional precept. This requirement of consistency 
between parliamentary and constitutional rules involves delivering immense power in the 
jurisdiction. Obviusly, in regard to this power, the problem is that the judiciary lacks 
democratic legitimacy in comparison with the legislator. 
The legitimacy deficit of the judiciary in a constitutional framework of course persists 
in being considered as an extraordinary problem. Although it can be said that this eminent 
problem requires today to incorporate or to take into account a new viewpoint or reflection, 
which is globalization and its impact on law. Indeed, Ferrajoli’s Principia Iuris, which may 
be understood as a genuine treatise on Law and Democracy Theory8, adds this kind of 
reflection to the study of the rule of law in the constitutional democracy. After presenting a 
detailed theory on models of law in his first volume, beginning with the least sophisticated 
of models (law in primitive societies) up to percieved models of maturity (i.e., modern 
constitutional democracies), Ferrajoli reserved the second volume to the Theory of 
Democracy by focusing on the globalization process as a kind of a progressive Rule of Law 
stumble. 
Globalization cannot be considered a new, genuine phenomenon. The Dictionary of 
the Spanish Royal Academy defines globalization as being a “trend of markets and 
corporations to spread themselves, reaching a global dimension that goes beyond national 
boundaries”.  Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the proposed definition for the twenty-third 
issue of the Spanish Dictionary considers the political and social implications of 
globalization by stating that globalization is “the process by which economies and markets, 
with the development of communication technologies, acquire a global dimension, so that 
there is increasing reliance on external markets and less on the regulatory action of 
governments”. 
David Held pointed out that the economy and economic relations operate as a driving 
force in contemporary globalization. One cannot perform a conceptualization of the nature 
and model of globalization without referring to this aspect 9 . Held suggests examing 
globalization from a wider perspective (rather than solely focusing on the economic 
aspects), taking into special consideration the mutation at the political level and more 
importantly, in the field of the Law.  For this reason, Held identified globalization with 
structural changes in the scale or scope of social, economic, and political relations, as well 
as in its organizational principles10. 
Globalization represents an economic process with high technological support in the 
continual development of new technologies in transportation, information and 
communication alongside ideological evolution (neoliberal political philosophy). 
Globalization also has remarkable political effects (larger interdependence between states 
and the subsequent weakening of the nation-state as a monopolistic power within its 
 
8 See Ferrajoli, L., Principia Iuris. Teoría del Derecho y de la Democracia (2007), 3 vols., transl. from Italian 
by Andrés, P., Bayón, J. C., Gascón, M., Prieto, L., Ruiz Miguel, A., Madrid, Trotta, 2011.    
9
 See Held, D, and MacGrew, A., Global Transformations (1999), the Global Transformations Reader (2000), 
Governing Globalization (2002). Also see Held, D., and MacGrew, A., Goldblatt, D., Perraton Globalization 
Theory. Approaches and Controversies, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.  
10
 Ibid.   
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borders).  Moreover, globalization generates legal effects that should be entirely necessary 
for legal theory and legal sciences to have a better understanding and greater exposure.  For 
instance, today's standards of supranational bodies have greater weight than before (i.e., 
European Union) along with recommendations from other supranational institutions that 
operate in parallel to nation-states and the EU, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or World Bank (WB).  The last “soft rules” are not purely binding, but in practice, 
have a greater influence on the contents of state law.   
Consequences of globalization that pose a clear legal challenge are the increasing 
ineffectiveness of the tributary; lax financial rules towards the of taxation of corporate 
profits and personal fortunes, and the privatization and subsequent deregulation of public 
sectors and industries.  To counteract these changes against the law-making process, the 
growing use of government decrees have become more common in place of parliamentary 
law, leaving the judiciary only slightly convinced with regards to the applicability of law 
due to the complexities present between multiple sources and jurisdictions.  As the result, 
until recently, to counteract the economic and financial crises, the presence of such 
disrepancies (in the aforementioned) has led to the inclusion of constitutional mandates 
regarding budget stability.   
Political and legal sciences have approached globalization from varying viewpoints, 
though, however, there does exist an eminent consensus on two fronts.  Firstly, a large 
portion of the global problems faced by nation-states transecnd their traditional borders, 
whose effectiveness in resolve are just capable enough with the necessary government 
principles and global standards to address such issues, along with continual economic 
imbalances (i.e., environmental degradation; organized, transnational crime, and 
migration).  
Secondly, legal and political concepts (in the domestic, national context) are 
increasingly becoming less explanatory.  Moreover, the low fecundity of many explanatory 
categories is obvious with respect to the law making process (new and multiple sources), 
especialy in their use or application (with the complexity in the application of sources of 
law with concurrent powers) 11 .  Regarding this mismatch between political and legal 
sciences, realistically speaking, attention must be given to Ferrajoli's recent works, whose 
preface admits (to some extent) that his theoretical approach towards the constitutional rule 
of law is not a theory of law in force, being that in practice, certain aspects are not precisely 
recognizable as a result of globalization.  Hence, his insistence on “taking seriously” the 
possibility of a global public power (in the form of a global democracy) is a logical demand 
or corollary of the meaning of the constitutional State12.   
Furthermore, Ferrajoli’s theory, which proposes the highest degree of effectiveness of 
the rights by setting up techniques of guarantee (“garantismo”) 13 , dispenses a crucial 
importance to the effects of globalization: the irreversible decline of the nation-state. This 
phenomenon makes entirely relevant the question about the weakness of democracy that is 
 
11
 Walker, N., “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism”, The Modern Law Review, Volume 65, Issue 3, pgs 317–
359, May 2002.  
12
 See the Preface to Principia Iuris, op. cit., V y VII.  
13
 The existence of rigid, binding and guaranteed Constitutions, with a great number of material or substantive 
standars and demands, according to many authors, the need to redefine the theoretical paradigm of current 
constitutional Democracy.  For Ferrajoli, such a paradigm is defined by what he calls “guarantees” that represent 
“the other side of the Constitutionalism”, and whose hallmark is the formulation of the “best assurance techniques 
to ensure the highest degree of effectiveness of the rights recognized constitutionally”, Ferrajoli, L., 
“Juspositivismo crítico y democracia constitucional” (transl. into Spanish by Córdova L, y Salazar, P.), Isonomia, 
16 (2002), p. 16.   
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traditionaly linked to the framework of a nation.  It is obvious that the decline of the nation-
state does not mean the end of democracy, but important institutional reforms are required 
given that the current state of affairs over the possibility of democracy not exclusively 
being in the public powers of the nation-state.  From this perspective, according to 
Ferrajoli, the expansion of constitutional democracy throughout the global order is, to some 
extent, the only available guarantee for peace and security in a world of growing inequality. 
However, the challenge of a “global constitutional democracy” is far from arousing 
consensus among those who share the opinion about the weakening of both nation-states 
and their legal rules.  This is not the most appropriate place to address the multiple and 
sophisticated criticism of the idea of a global constitutional democracy.  Therefore, it can be 
enough to point out that there are several reasons to doubt the aptitude of such an order.  
For instance, the inability to achieve a global consensus about the institutions where 
competence must reside to create and apply the law along with the fear of power 
concentration in institutions too far from the citizenry (Zolo) are of concern.  Also, the 
difficulty to agree upon constitutional principles at the global level is ever present given the 
vast, influential, cultural differences (Bayon).   
Surprisingly, not even those authors who encourage global constitutionalism (by the 
likes of Habermas or Ferrajoli) defend the institutional and regulatory extrapolation of the 
nation-state’s constitutional elements to the global sphere. Thus, Habermas (for example) 
contemplates the construction of supranational bodies such as the European Union as being 
a step towards creating a common venue for deliberation beyond the traditional nation-state 
platform 14 . Regarding Ferrajoli’s viewpoint, this common-venue approach does not 
advocate for a world parliament, but rather, the existence of secondary guarantee-
institutions (i.e., courts that enforce primary guarantees). 
In fact, there exists an intermediate position between the globalism strictu sensu and 
the continuation of the traditional, nation-state status quo. This is the thesis of multilevel 
sovereignty (Pernice, Turégano): the political and legal participation (or involement) in 
global affairs at every level of government (local, state, regional, and global)15. In this 
proposal for multilevel sovereignty, the nation-state maintains its role as principle actor on 
the road towards a global democracy. Likewise, the nation-state preserves its leading role in 
a globalized society without clearly distinguishing between domestic and foreign politics. 
In short, this thesis is almost as consistent with the ideals of ethical cosmopolitanism as the 
thesis of global democracy strictu sensu. But, it could be considered more realistic than the 
prior, since the nation-state should be a main political and legal actor in the gradual or 
progressive way of setting up global, public institutions for the sake of citizen proximity 
(aside from large tradition). 
From a humble viewpoint, further discussion may determine that this multilevel 
proposal does not suffer from any danger.  The detachment between politicians and citizens 
could increase given that keeping the state as the main political agent requires governments 
(not parliaments) to make decisions. In this sense, parliamentary, democratic deliberation 
becomes a simple formality in accordance to the model of multilevel sovereignty that 
presumes the emergence of law as being more Governance-based (with the ambiguity and 
 
14 Habermas, J., Zur Verfassung Europas. Ein Essay, Suhrkamp Verlag, Berlin, 2011. There is a Spanish 
translation, La constitución de Europa, Madrid, Trotta, 2012.   
15
 See Pernice, I., “Multilevel constitutionalism and the Treatry of Amsterdam: European Constitution Making 
Revisited?”, Common Market Law Review, 36 (1999).  To some extent, and with certain doubt, this is also the 
thesis of Isabel Turégano in order to challenge the nation-state crisis, see Turegano, I., Justicia global: los límites 
del constitucionalismo, Lima, Palestra, 2010.  
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vagueness of this political concept) than from genuine Democracy.  It may be doubtful that 
governance equals democracy unless governance is built upon transparency and 
accountability. 
 
III. The “Global” Economic Crisis 
  
To briefly reiterate, globalization had originated in the economic and financial sectors, 
characterized by the development and expansion of markets beyond national boundaries, 
thanks in large part to technological advances and neoliberal, political philosophy with 
social advantages of self-regulation and deregulation of markets. Globalization has gone on 
to affect all kinds of social interactions (i.e., economic, financial, political, and cultural 
relationships). 
One could argue that global problems require global solutions, problems and solutions 
that usually deal with proposals for institutional reforms to the realization of the rule of law 
at the global level (global, constitutional democracy; multilevel sovereignty; governance; 
etc...). Currently, able-minded citizenry around the world understand that we are facing a 
financial and economic “crisis”, whose characteristic is “global” in nature. In other words, 
the severity of current, financial problems correspond with the numerous economic, 
political and social problems that originated between 2007-2010 in the US and European 
Union, with a continuation into the present that constitutes a situation of crisis on a global 
scale.  Consequently, how to address the crisis is not just economic in nature; rather, said 
crisis is also a challenge for political and legal sciences. 
However, the economic crisis revealed the absence of financial market controls that 
generated greater risks for economic development. Neither nation-state law nor 
international public law was prepared to avoid the damaging effects on economies of 
financial transactions at the global level16. 
The term “crisis” is commonly used in the medical field to explain a “sudden change 
in the course of a disease”.  A crisis can also be associated with situations of continual 
doubt, modification, or termination, not to mention, having conotations such as difficult or 
complicated.  Briefly, this current global crisis originated in financial markets through the 
issuance of risky, subprime mortgages and central bank (US Federal Reserve and European 
Central Bank) policies of low interest rates with subsequent increases in money supplies 
(liquidity injections)17.  
With regard to subprime mortgages, it should be noted that many banks had 
traditionally acted as credit institutions whose liquidity depended upon savers' deposits.  
However, financial sophistication evolved with the creation of derivative instruments and 
products (i.e., mortgage-backed securities, structured investment vehicles, and credit 
default swaps).  These exotic products were then marketed as securities through brokerages, 
investments funds, and investment banks, which were then offered to conventional and 
traditional banks to be sold amongst clients or investors.  When home-price appreciated 
peaked, borrowers could were unable to refinance.  Thus, mortgage-backed securities 
traded upwards while homeowner default had increaed as well. 
 
 
16
 See Swchawrcz, S. L., “Leverhulme Lecture: The global financial crisis and systemic risk”, (November 9, 
2010). Video, audio, and full text available at http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/published/leverhulme2010.php  
17
 Torrero Mañas, A., La crisis financiera internacional y sus efectos sobre la economía española , Madrid-
Barcelona-Buenos Aires, Marcial Pons, 2011; Requeijo, J., Odisea 2050. La Economía mundial del siglo XXI  
(2009), Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2011, p. 15.  
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This led to a “bursting of the bubble” that was already foreshadowed by top managers 
and authorities who were fully aware of the reality of investment bank balance sheets, 
resulting in stock market collapses and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, notably 
referred to as “Black Monday On Wall Street” on August 15th, 2008.  Soon after, further 
bankruptcies emerged with those of Merrill Lynch and American International Group that 
fueled a financial crisis of incalculable dimensions since banks in the majority of countries 
had distributed amongst its customers these so-called “toxic assets”. 
It can be argued that bubble generation occurred since the beginning of the 21st 
Century with the expansionary monteray policies of central banks through the creation of 
low-interest rate environments up until the crisis revealed itself in all of its starkness.  In 
other words, the economic model of growth based on the increase in production required 
cheap credit to increase public and private consumption (i.e., business investment, private 
consumption, and in some cases, public spending with particular focus on infrastructure and 
“welfare”).  The crisis took place as a result of a mismatch between the real economy 
(inflation-fueled retractions) and securities on stock exchanges.  The latter does not reflect 
actual state accounting of banks and companies. 
Its controversy is still unknown whether this crisis is purely recessionary or 
stagflation-based (similar to the 1970's) with an estimated period of decline whose duration 
may be 3, 5 or 10 years.  On the contrary, a real depression may exist.  Once again referring 
to the medical metaphor of a crisis, the uncertainty of surviving a disease is present if it is a 
systemic crisis with dimensions equal to, or greater than, the Crash of 1929, which would 
then involve the collapse of the economic model18.  So, if the current economic crisis is 
more akin to the Great Depression than the Yom Kippur War, it could be argued that the 
current crisis is equivalent to a state of coma, or even death of the patient19. 
If we are immersed in a recession, then the law-making process (even law-application) 
needs the tools and concepts of economic analysis. Legal matters must give special 
consideration to the reflections that are made from the economic analysis of law that 
focuses its attention on the effectiveness and efficiency of rules; on the consequences of the 
implementation of the law, etc. But, if the hypothesis is feasible that it was a systemic 
crisis, in other words, a collapse of the economic model, “nothing will be as it was before”. 
It may be doubtful that legal codes and current legislation are truly able to deal with the 
waterfall of problems. 
Surely, scholars in the coming decades are going to focus on the model of public 
expenditure and the sustainability of the welfare state in a (sort of) new constitutional order, 
where the most important thing will be the reliability that states and companies deserve 
from the markets. 
 
IV. The So-Called Constitutionalisation of the Economic Crisis 
 
The question in contention is whether or not the crisis is currently precipitating a 
constituent moment, at least in the European framework. Grosso modo, anxious situations 
or uncertainties are presenting themselves in the proposals on the immediate future of 
Europe as an economic and political union.  This situation is not new. Take into 
consideration the failure of the Lisbon Treaty that attempted to advance the political 
 
18
 See Niño-Becerra, S., Más allá del Crash. Apuntes para una crisis, Barcelona, Los libros del lince, 2011, 
pp. 63 y ss.   
19
 See Requeijo, J., Odisea 2050, op cit., pp. 40 y ss.   
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construction and integration of Europe.  However, in comparison with prior years, what has 
changed is the urgency to decide, the urgency to make a decision about whether European 
political integration is actually carried out and under what conditions such construction 
must take place. 
Should the case be for the construction of a real political union, consideration would 
then be given to the nature of sovereignty; whether conceptual democracy needs revision 
(through the debate of how political representation benefits the citizenry or political class); 
on how to properly regulate and protect fundamental rights, and on how to efficiently 
implement the distribution of competences between European institutions and member 
states (within these, the interaction between state, regional, and local institutions).  These 
topics would be the focus of both scholars and politicians.  However, current events have 
shown that this logic (or discourse) is not actually inspiring the process of European, 
political integration.  The financial and debt crises have precipitated constitutional reforms 
in the member states and in the treaties of the European Union.  Such reforms have been 
understood as being fundamental tools for harnessing the economic and financial crises, the 
cornerstone being the golden rule of budgetary stability (i.e., the trend towards a balanced 
budget so that the planned amount of money for the public administration to spend is no 
greater than the income received).  
The present economic crisis is going to cause certain guidelines (such as the balanced 
budget rule) to go beyond the realm of mere cyclicity by becoming permanently 
incorporated within the essence of political structures and legal systems20.  In fact, not only 
Eurozone countries, but also EU states and the main countries in the world have found in 
the constitutionalisation of the rule or the principle of the budgetary stability the only exit, 
or the best way to cope with the financial and debt crises. 
Nevertheless, there exists a persistent anxiety regarding the construction of a 
European, federal state.  Those states most affected by the financial crisis (despite their 
genuine intentions of participating in, and maintaining, a solid, political union) have 
genuine fears.  These member states fear the endured ramifications of a procedural, 
transformational regionalization (i.e., “neo-colonialism”) at the discretion of those more 
economically robust and affluent member states, considering the varying degrees of 
perception between the “center-north countries”, “periphery-south countries”, and “side-
line countries”.  Those “periphery-south countries” that are more maltreated by the 
financial and economic crises (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) are advocating 
for an affirmation of construction policies.  They are betting on the strengthening of EU 
institutions.  They would be consenting to the loss of sovereignty that would imply a 
“federalist” process, yet, clearly not “neocolonialist”. 
The “center-north countries” (i.e., Germany, Holland, and Finland) have quite an 
interest in politically solidifying the Eurozone because they fear that the crises would 
become endemic (without a rescue or bailout of the “periphery-south countries”), with 
themselves eventually succombing to the consequences. To this extent, it seems that they 
will refinance or rescue the peripheral countries.  However, there seems to be a lack of 
sincere trust within the political union as a result of the harsh conditions of the rescues that 
requires a high degree of external intervention with possible, serious setbacks in the 
credibility of constitutionally guaranteed rights (health, education, pensions, employment 
conditions, research investment, etc.). 
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Upon examining the current state of affairs, a clear conclusion that can be drawn from 
the principles at the heart of European, political consolidation (starting with budget 
stability) are principles that leave little room for the development of welfare policies and 
for solidarity among states in varying socio-economic conditions. 
 
V. Who Should Be the Sovereign in this New Constitutional Order? 
  
The golden rule of budget stability appears to be establishing itself as the anchor of a 
new, European, constitutional order where this rule represents one of the progressive 
conditions in the construction of a European political union.  Furthermore, this rule seems 
to be undeniable regardless of its severity, in particular with economically inferior 
countries.  
Budget stability is not an ideologically, neutral rule; rather, a liberal ideology 
compromised of positive noninterventionism.  Perspectively, the assumption of this rule by 
the European Union leads to a questioning of the interaction between policy, law authority, 
and economics.  With these anti-Keynesian measures in the medium-term for a real 
economy, it would seem that the golden rule of budget stability exclusively represents the 
interests of financial markets and investors21.  Rating agencies that evaluate the effect or 
impact on the reliability of countries reveals that the main beneficiaries of risk volatility are 
the markets. Markets always benefit, either through the speculation of states and 
corporations that pay very high interest, or ensuring the receival of interest on their loans in 
low risk countries. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
  
Before the Eurozone crisis, it was quite difficult to discern if the EU was walking 
towards a process of supranational constitutionalisation, that is to say, towards a federation 
of European states that would be able to compete with other economically powerful 
regions, such as the US or China.  Today, the process of constitutionalisation is 
precipitating itself as a result of the economic and financial crises.  Its effects and result are 
still the “positivization” at the highest level of the rule of budget stability. The mentioned 
rule involves set limits to welfare state policies, and ultimately, to the policies that trend to 
ensure equal opportunities for individuals to exercise their rights22. 
If the political consolidation of the European political union were realized from the 
constitutionalisation of austerity, one might demystify the constitutional process since it 
could be argued that the processes of constitutionalisation (by itself) do not involve the 
guarantee of democracy and rights.  The progress or setbacks that involve a constitutional 
process will depend on the content and the impact of the principles (or rules) that support 
such a process of constitutionalisation. 
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